Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 52
Number 3 Teaching Intellectual Property Law
(Spring 2008)

Article 19

2008

Friend or Foe: Reasonable Noncompete Restrictions Can Benefit
Corporate In-House Counsel and Protect Corporate Employers
Barbara C. Bentrup

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Barbara C. Bentrup, Friend or Foe: Reasonable Noncompete Restrictions Can Benefit Corporate In-House
Counsel and Protect Corporate Employers, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol52/iss3/19

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FRIEND OR FOE: REASONABLE NONCOMPETE RESTRICTIONS
CAN BENEFIT CORPORATE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AND PROTECT
CORPORATE EMPLOYERS

INTRODUCTION
Historically it has been an ethical violation for attorneys to enter into
agreements that limit or restrict their ability to practice law upon leaving
employment. This view began with American Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics Formal Opinion 300 (ABA Formal Opinion 300),1 was
developed through subsequent ethics opinions and legal cases,2 and is now
reflected in the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6, which states
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar
type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after
termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits
upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is
3
part of the settlement of a client controversy.

Forty-nine states have adopted Model Rule 5.6 or some modified version
of it or its predecessor, ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility D.R.
2-108.4 Although the emphasis has shifted over the years, the rationale for the
prohibition on these post-employment restrictions has primarily been that they
restrict: (1) the right of the attorney to practice law and (2) the ability of the
client to choose his or her preferred attorney.5 The various ethics opinions and
court cases that have evolved primarily focus on the rule as it relates to lawyers
who leave a firm in order to practice law at another firm.
There has been limited focus on the issue as it relates to post-employment
agreements between corporate in-house counsel and their employers, and the
1. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
2. See infra Part I.A.1.
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2003).
4. See Linda Sorenson Ewald, Agreements Restricting the Practice of Law: A New Look at
an Old Paradox, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 6 & n.11 (2002). Maine is the only state with a rule that
allows restrictions on the practice of law as a condition for receiving post-employment
compensation. Id. at 6.
5. See id. at 7–11.
1037
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ethics opinions that have considered the matter have split somewhat on the
issue.6 In July 2006, the New Jersey Committee on Professional Ethics
released Opinion 708, which opined that New Jersey Rule of Professional
Conduct (RPC) 5.6 was applicable to in-house counsel and that postemployment restrictive covenants are an ethical violation.7 Few lawyers
recognize the potential conflicts of interest inherent in changing corporate inhouse counsel positions, especially when staying in the same industry,8 or
when moving from a corporation to a law firm. This area of potential conflicts
warrants more attention given the trend of more companies bringing lawyers
in-house,9 particularly given their direct corporate-related responsibilities.10
This Comment will focus on the applicability of Model Rule 5.6 (and the
various versions adopted by the states and other jurisdictions) to noncompete
agreements between corporate in-house counsel and their corporate employers.
Part I will provide a historical analysis and the current status of noncompete
clauses and their impact on legal and other professions. Part I will also
examine the applicability of the per se ban to in-house counsel under the New
Jersey opinion and how other jurisdictions have addressed the issue. Part II
will provide a critical analysis of the alternative approaches to this issue by
exploring why in-house counsel and other corporate-employed attorneys are
different from attorneys practicing law in law firms, why the rule should be
different as it pertains to those attorneys, and why the jurisdictions should be
consistent. The analysis in Part II and the Conclusion will advocate that
jurisdictions take a reasonableness test approach similar to that used in other
professions (and for attorneys in California and Arizona) when applying their
version of Model Rule 5.6 to in-house counsel and other corporate-employed
attorneys, depending on the type of post-corporate employment, the particular
position of the employee, and the individual facts of the situation.
I. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND CURRENT STATUS
A.

Noncompete Agreements for Attorneys and Other Professions

The various approaches to noncompete restrictive covenants in agreements
pertaining to the employment of attorneys are (1) a per se ban on all direct and
indirect noncompete restrictive covenants; (2) the enforceability of reasonable
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2006).
8. Molly McDonough, A “Simmering Issue” for Corporate Counsel: New Jersey Ruling
Says Noncompete Clauses Violate Ethics Rules, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Aug. 29, 2006 (on file with
author).
9. Scott W. Williams, Comment, Keeping Secrets “In-House”: Different Approaches to
Client Confidentiality for General Counsel, 1 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 78, 79, 94 (1999).
10. See Molly McDonough, Moving Targets: Some Courts May Be Changing Course on
Corporate Counsel Mobility, A.B.A. J. Dec. 2006, at 20, 22.
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financial disincentives similar to liquidated damages clauses; (3) the
application of a common law reasonableness test that governs noncompete
agreements for other professions and businesses; and (4) the use of “savings
clauses,” which essentially forbid noncompete restrictions for attorneys leaving
a company and going into the practice of law, but may allow, under certain
circumstances, noncompete restrictions for employed attorneys who leave the
employment of one corporation to go to a competitor corporation.
1.

The Majority Approach: A Per Se Ban

The majority of jurisdictions have taken the position of a per se ban on
both direct and indirect (for example, financial provisions that indirectly
restrict the right to practice law) restrictive covenants and have applied this
logic to both attorneys in law firms and in-house counsel.11 This approach has
been rationalized on two grounds: the right of attorneys to practice their
profession, and the right of clients to hire the attorney of their choice.12 A brief
history of this approach follows.
Since ABA Formal Opinion 300 in 1961, most jurisdictions have
fashioned a per se rule against any type of post-employment restriction
impacting the rights of attorneys to practice law.13 ABA Formal Opinion 300
and other early ethics opinions and court cases based their decisions on the
unreasonable restriction of the right of the attorney to practice law.14 In ABA
Formal Opinion 300, the Committee was asked to determine whether a lawyer
could sign an employment agreement that contained a restrictive covenant
“prohibiting the [lawyer] from practicing law in the city and county in which
the lawyer practices for a period of two years after termination of the
employment.”15 The Committee opined that this would be an “unwarranted
restriction on the right of a lawyer to choose where he will practice and
inconsistent with our professional status.”16
ABA Informal Opinion 1072 addressed a similar question as to whether a
partnership agreement could include a restrictive covenant that would limit a
11. See, e.g., Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992); Dwyer v.
Jung, 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410
(N.Y. 1989); see also D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 291 (1999); N.J. Advisory Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2006); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 96-5 (1996); Va.
Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Opinion 1615 (1995).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 22–28.
13. Ewald, supra note 4, at 5–6; Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition
Agreements While Maintaining the Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84
MINN. L. REV. 915, 925–31 (2000).
14. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1171 (1971); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1072 (1968).
15. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
16. Id.
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withdrawing partner from practicing law within the county in which the firm
was located for a period of five years.17 Although there had been an earlier
opinion (ABA Informal Opinion 521) that indicated that a restrictive covenant
with reasonable and legal limits as between partners dealing on an equal
footing was not a question of ethics, Informal Opinion 1072 overruled
Informal Opinion 521.18 Informal Opinion 1072 referred to Formal Opinion
300 and indicated that the Committee saw no difference in terms of the ethical
question whether the restrictive covenant was in an agreement between a
lawyer and his employer or between lawyer-partners on equal footing.19 The
Committee concluded that
The right to practice law is a privilege granted by the State, and so long as a
lawyer holds his license to practice, this right cannot and should not be
restricted by such an agreement . . . . The attorney must remain free to practice
when and where he will and to be available to prospective clients who might
20
desire to engage his services.

Similarly, ABA Informal Opinion 1171 opined that it would not be ethical for
a partnership agreement to limit the ability of a disassociating partner to
provide services to certain former clients of his prior firm.21
Despite this early focus on the unreasonable restriction on the right of the
attorney to practice law, the prevailing and current justification for prohibiting
post-employment restrictions is the client’s right to choose counsel. This
prevailing focus “can be traced to a 1975 New Jersey case, Dwyer v. Jung, in
which the superior court refused to enforce a restrictive covenant included in a
partnership agreement among lawyers.”22 In Dwyer, the restrictive covenant in
question designated clients to each partner upon termination of the partnership
and prevented a partner from “doing business with a client designated as that
of another partner for a period of . . . five years.”23 The court held that this was
a violation of DR 2-108(A) (the predecessor to Model Rule 5.6) as it restricted
“the right of the lawyer to choose his clients in the event they seek his
services” and “the right of the client to choose the lawyer he wishes to
represent him,” and as such was “void as against public policy.”24
The subsequent New York decision in Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord
emphasized that

17. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1072 (1968).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1171 (1971).
22. Wilcox, supra note 13, at 924 (citing Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1975)).
23. Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 499.
24. Id. at 501.
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While a law firm has a legitimate interest in its own survival and economic
well-being and in maintaining its clients, it cannot protect those interests by
contracting for the forfeiture of earned revenues during the withdrawing
partner’s active tenure and participation and by, in effect, restricting the
choices of the clients to retain and continue the withdrawing member as
25
counsel.

The next leading case was the New Jersey decision in Jacob v. Norris,
McLaughlin & Marcus, in 1992.26 The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on
RPC 5.6 and indicated that its
underlying purpose is to ensure the freedom of clients to select counsel of their
choice, despite its wording in terms of the lawyer’s right to practice. The RPC
is thus designed to serve the public interest in maximum access to lawyers and
27
to preclude commercial arrangements that interfere with that goal.

Since Jacob, a number of jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions and
have based those conclusions “upon a policy of protecting the client’s choice
of counsel.”28
The expansion of the majority position beyond direct prohibitions (such as
geography and time) to indirect prohibitions (such as financial provisions that
indirectly restrict the right to practice law) has been upheld in many
jurisdictions.29 Courts have found that these financial disincentives can
discourage an attorney from withdrawing from a firm, or in the event the
attorney does withdraw these provisions can discourage the attorney from
accepting business from former clients of the firm, either of which works
toward restricting the right of clients to choose the attorney of their choice.30
2.

The Minority Approach: Enforcing Reasonable Financial
Disincentives

The minority view, as applied in California and Arizona, holds that
reasonable restrictions on competition by lawyers similar to a liquidated
damages clause may be enforced without violating the state versions of Model
Rule 5.6.31 The California and Arizona courts applied a reasonableness test in
determining that noncompete agreements that applied a financial disincentive
to competition are not per se void or unethical.32

25. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 413 (N.Y. 1989) (second emphasis added).
26. 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
27. Id. at 146.
28. Wilcox, supra note 13, at 929.
29. See, e.g., Jacob, 607 A.2d at 148–49; Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411.
30. See, e.g., Jacob, 607 A.2d at 148–49; Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411.
31. Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 729 (Ariz. 2006);
Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1994).
32. See Fearnow, 138 P.3d at 729; Howard, 863 P.2d at 160.
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Until recently, California was the only jurisdiction that took a different
approach from the per se ban. In Howard v. Babcock, the California Supreme
Court recognized that an absolute ban on a lawyer’s right to practice would be
per se unreasonable; however, the court concluded that other reasonable
restrictions on competition by lawyers similar to a liquidated damages clause
may be enforced without violating Rule 1-500 (California’s version of ABA
In Howard, the agreement in question required
Model Rule 5.6).33
withdrawing partners to forgo certain withdrawal benefits (basically, their
share of the accounts receivable and work-in-progress that they would have
been entitled to if they had not withdrawn from the partnership) if they
competed with their former law firm.34 The Supreme Court of California
stated that the agreement did not restrict the practice of law but rather
“attache[d] an economic consequence to a departing partner’s unrestricted
choice to pursue a particular kind of practice” by competing against his former
partners.35 The court recognized that a law firm has economic interests that
need to be protected, similar to those of any other business, and that the
increased mobility of partners creates a need for firms to protect these
economic interests by including covenants such as that contained in the
Howard agreement.36 The court saw no legal justification for treating partners
in law firms different from partners in any other profession or business.37 The
court noted that this was different from the interpretation of similar ethics rules
reached by other jurisdictions and indicated that it disagreed “with the analysis
proffered by these courts to justify such an interpretation.”38 The court noted
that there are many restrictions, both from a general business standpoint and in
other ethics rules, on the ability of the lawyer to accept employment or to
represent certain clients.39 Further, the court noted that “contemporary
changes in the legal profession . . . make the assertion that the practice of law
is not comparable to a business unpersuasive and unreflective of reality.”40 In
summary, the court indicated that an agreement placing a reasonable price on
competition would not discourage lawyers from continuing to represent clients

33. Howard, 863 P.2d at 160.
34. Id. at 151.
35. Id. at 156.
36. Id. at 157.
37. Id.
38. Howard, 863 P.2d at 158. There are two main reasons that other jurisdictions have
proffered for imposing a rule against restrictive covenants: (1) anticompetitive covenants restrict
attorneys’ freedom to practice law and (2) the practice of law is not a business and clients are not
commodities. Id.
39. Id. at 158–59.
40. Id. at 159.
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who employ them, and would be consistent with agreements used in other
professions.41
In July 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court decided to follow the California
approach in Howard with its opinion in Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere
& Evans, P.C., holding that an agreement that imposes a reasonable financial
disincentive on competing former partners is enforceable.42 “[S]uch an
agreement does not violate [Ethical Rule] 5.6(a), but rather should be evaluated
under the well-established law governing similar restrictive covenants in
agreements between non-lawyers.”43 However, the Supreme Court of Arizona
did recognize that restrictive covenants that forbid a lawyer to represent certain
clients or practice in certain areas for certain periods of time violate Arizona
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6(a).44
These various cases and ethics opinions illustrate that these decisions have
been primarily limited to agreements between lawyers and law firms, and that
the ethics rules clearly indicate that there is a per se violation if an agreement
completely restricts the lawyer’s ability to practice law. Except for California
and Arizona, all other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have indicated
that any indirect approach, such as a financial disincentive, that restricts the
ability of the lawyer to practice upon leaving the firm or the right of the client
to select the lawyer of his choice is also a violation of the ethics rule.45
3.

Noncompetes in Other Fields: The Common Law Reasonableness
Test

A third approach is the common law reasonableness test that governs
noncompete agreements for other professions and businesses.46 Other
professional and non-professional employers have not historically been subject
to the same restrictions as the legal profession, and have been able to enforce
reasonable noncompete agreements.47 Enforcement of reasonable contractual
restraints has been “justified on the ground that the employer has a legitimate
interest in restraining the employee from appropriating valuable trade
information and customer relationships to which he had access in the course of

41. Id. at 157, 159.
42. 138 P.3d 723, 729 (Ariz. 2006).
43. Id. at 724.
44. Id. at 729.
45. Ewald, supra note 4, at 38. Arizona’s Fearnow case was decided subsequent to the
Ewald article.
46. Wilcox, supra note 13, at 918.
47. 6 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 13:4–13:7 (4th ed. 1995); Ewald,
supra note 4, at 38–39; Robert F. Parker, Noncompete Agreements Between Lawyers: An
Economic Analysis, 40:4 RES GESTAE, Oct. 1996, at 12.
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his employment.”48 Legitimate interests have been established by showing
“both (i) that the nature of the customer relationship creates a legitimate
expectation of future business and (ii) that the departing employee has
benefited from the employment in a way that would make subsequent
competition by the departing employee unfair.”49 Several jurisdictions have
applied a reasonableness test and enforced noncompetition restrictions in
agreements between medical doctors.50 Arthur Young & Co. v. Black reached
a similar conclusion in regards to a restrictive covenant in a partnership
agreement between partners in an accounting firm.51 These courts follow a
reasonableness test approach similar to that outlined in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 188 when reviewing noncompetition agreements
between non-attorneys. The Restatement provides as follows:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is
ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in
restraint of trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s
legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and
the likely injury to the public.
(2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or
relationship include the following:
(a) a promise by the seller of a business not to compete with the buyer in
such a way as to injure the value of the business sold;
(b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his
employer or other principal;
(c) a promise by a partner not to compete with the partnership.

52

48. Wilcox, supra note 13, at 945 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188
cmt. b (1979)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 918; see, e.g., Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs., 510 S.E.2d 880, 884–85
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (reasonableness test used in upholding noncompete covenant in a surgeon’s
employment agreement by determining that the covenant was not geographically vague and the
size of the territory was necessary to protect the former employer’s business interests); Weber v.
Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 96–97 (Kan. 1996) (applying reasonableness test to time and territory
restrictions in a physician’s employment agreement); Cmty. Hosp. Group, Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d
884, 887 (N.J. 2005) (post-employment restrictive covenant in employment agreement between
neurosurgeon and hospital employer upheld as reasonable; however, broad geographic restriction
considered injurious to public health and required narrowing of scope).
51. Arthur Young & Company v. Black, 466 N.Y.S.2d 10, 10–11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981).
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Reasonableness is not assumed, and courts will look to the individual facts
of each case.53 For example, in Community Hospital Group, Inc. v. More, a
post-employment restrictive covenant in an employment agreement between a
neurosurgeon and a hospital employer was upheld as reasonable because the
hospital established that it had “several legitimate protectable interests,” the
two-year duration was reasonable, and enforcement “would not impose undue
hardship upon Dr. More.”54 The protectable business interests included
protecting the hospital’s investment in the physician’s training and education,
patient lists, and patient referral sources.55 There was no undue hardship
imposed on the physician by his entering into and being held to the
noncompete restriction because he was “a highly qualified neurosurgeon and
his services [were] in demand.”56 Although the restrictions could result in a
longer commute, he “voluntarily resigned and brought any [resulting] hardship
upon himself,” and such hardship should not be an impediment to enforcing
the restriction.57 However, the broad geographic restriction in Community
Hospital Group was considered injurious to public health and required
narrowing of its scope.58 On the other hand, in Keeley v. Cardiovascular
Surgical Assocs., P.C., the court applied the reasonableness test and
determined that the geographic area contained in the noncompete covenant was
reasonable under the circumstances of the case.59 In Rapp Insurance Agency
Inc. v. Baldree, an Illinois Appellate Court held that the noncompetition
agreement restricting the ability of an insurance agent to compete within
certain geographic and time constraints could not be enforced because the
plaintiff could not show a legitimate business interest.60 A legitimate business
interest could not be established because there was “no permanent customer
relationship or trade secret/confidential information involved.”61
The practice of law is the only profession that applies a per se ban on postemployment restrictive covenants.62 As illustrated above, the reasonableness
53. Keeley, 510 S.E.2d at 885 (reasonableness of territory size to be determined “in view of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.”); Cmty. Hosp. Group, 869 A.2d at 896–97
(“[T]he Karlin reasonableness test with emphasis on the public interest, is sufficiently flexible to
account for varying factual patterns that may arise.”).
54. 869 A.2d at 897–98.
55. Id. at 897.
56. Id. at 898.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 899–900.
59. 510 S.E.2d 880, 885 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
60. 597 N.E.2d 936, 938–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
61. Id. at 940.
62. Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete and the Legal Profession, 29 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 423, 424–25 (1985); Parker, supra note 47, at 12; see also Cmty. Hosp. Group, 869 A.2d at
895 (“Except for attorneys, and more recently, psychologists, [New Jersey] courts have
consistently utilized a reasonableness test to determine the enforceability of restrictive
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test or balancing test approach is applied to post-employment noncompete
restrictions in professions such as medicine and accounting.
Many
commentators believe that this approach should be adopted for lawyers and
law firms.63 This position will be considered more fully in Part II.
4.

Savings Clauses

The Washington and Connecticut ethics opinions64 allow noncompetition
restrictive covenants that use “savings clauses,” which essentially forbid
noncompete restrictions for attorneys leaving a company and going into the
practice of law but may allow, under certain circumstances, noncompete
restrictions for employed attorneys who leave the employment of one
corporation to go to a competitor corporation.65 This concept will be discussed
further in Part II.B.2.
B.

Applicability of Noncompete Restrictions to In-House Counsel
1.

New Jersey Ethics Opinion 708

In July 2006, the New Jersey Committee on Professional Ethics released
Opinion 708, which opined that New Jersey RPC 5.6 was applicable to inhouse counsel and that post-employment restrictive covenants are an ethical
violation.66 The inquiry to the Committee resulted from the following
provisions in a proposed employment agreement:
8. I agree that, during my employment and for a period of one (1) year
immediately after termination of my employment:
(a) I will not become employed by, provide services to or assist, whether
as a consultant, employee, officer, director, proprietor, partner or other
capacity, any person, firm, business or corporation which (i) is a
Competitor of [Employer] (as defined in paragraph 9 below) or (ii) is
seeking to become a Competitor of [Employer]; provided however, that

covenants.” (citations omitted)). In Comprehensive Psychology Sys., P.C. v. Prince, a
noncompete restriction in an employment agreement between a psychologist and his employer
was held unenforceable because of the improper interference between the psychologist and his
patients and because, similar to the legal profession, the state Board of Psychological Examiners
had enacted a rule prohibiting such noncompete restrictions. 867 A.2d 1187, 1189–90 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). This is the only noted exception outside the legal profession.
63. Ewald, supra note 4, at 38–54; Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Let’s Be Reasonable: Rethinking
the Prohibition Against Noncompete Clauses in Employment Contracts Between Attorneys in
North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 249, 266–79 (2003); Parker, supra note 47; Wilcox, supra note
13, at 945–70.
64. See infra Part I.B.2.
65. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002); Wash. State Bar
Ass’n, Informal Op. 2100 (2005).
66. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006).
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the provisions of this subparagraph (a) shall not apply if my employment
is terminated by [Employer] without cause . . . .
9. As used in this Agreement, “Competitor or [Employer]” means any person,
firm, corporation or business which, directly or indirectly, develops,
manufactures, sells or distributes products and/or services, that are the same, or
substantially similar to, or compete in the marketplace with, the products
and/or services developed, manufactured, sold or distributed by the business
unit(s) in which I worked, or as to which I had access to Trade Secrets,
Proprietary and Confidential Information, during the last two (2) years of my
67
employment with [Employer].

The Committee’s rationale referred to ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Informal Opinion No. 1301 and Formal Opinion
94-381, which both concluded that there was no difference in the ethical
impact when the agreement in question pertained to in-house or corporate
counsel as opposed to practicing attorneys as addressed in earlier ethics
opinions.68 ABA Informal Opinion No. 1301 addressed an inquiry as to
whether an employment agreement between a corporate employer and a
lawyer-employee could contain a provision that restricted the lawyer-employee
from accepting employment with a competitor for a period of two years after
termination of the lawyer’s employment for the avowed purpose of protecting
the corporation’s confidential information and trade secrets.69 The ABA
Committee indicated that although DR 2-108(A) (the predecessor to Model
Rule 5.6) proscribed such an agreement only between attorneys, the underlying
ethical considerations were the same, i.e., “[a]n attorney at law should remain
free to practice his profession at all times.”70 The ABA Committee further
indicated that as to the stated purpose of maintaining confidentiality, the
restrictive covenant was “undesirable surplusage” because adequate protection
of confidences already exists under various ethics rules.71 ABA Formal
Opinion 94-381 opined that an employment agreement for either an outside
lawyer or an in-house lawyer could not be contingent on agreeing to a
restrictive covenant not to represent anyone against the corporation in the
future, as such a provision is overbroad and an impermissible restriction on the
right to practice law.72 The ABA Committee found that:
Just as in the partnership situation, restricting a lawyer from ever representing
one whose interests are adverse to a former client would impermissibly restrain
a lawyer from engaging in his profession. Moreover, in both situations, the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 (1975).
Id.
Id.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-381 (1994).
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public would be restricted from access to lawyers who, by virtue of their
background and experience, might be the best available lawyers to represent
them. While a current client’s interests should assume a certain priority for the
lawyer, the extent of those interests that continue to have a claim on the lawyer
after the lawyer-client relationship is terminated is defined by the scope of the
restriction contained in Model Rule 1.9. A lawyer may not ethically ask for
nor may a lawyer agree to any further restriction unnecessarily compromising
the strong policy in favor of providing the public with a free choice of
73
counsel.

New Jersey Ethics Opinion 708 concurred with these ABA opinions and
further indicated that New Jersey RPC 5.6 was applicable to corporate counsel
because: (1) RPC 1:14 states that the Rules of Professional Conduct “shall
govern the conduct of members of the bar and judges and employees of all
courts of this State”74 and therefore applies to any lawyer admitted to the New
Jersey bar; and (2) New Jersey Supreme Court Rule 1:27-2 permits any inhouse lawyer based in New Jersey but not admitted to the New Jersey bar to
hold a limited license authorizing the attorney to perform legal work solely
related to that employer, and requires the lawyer to follow the New Jersey
Rules of Professional Conduct.75 The New Jersey Committee further relied on
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Community Hospital Group,
which distinguished noncompete agreements between attorneys from those
among physicians.76 The Community Hospital Group court distinguished
attorneys from physicians by reasoning that the court has the “power to govern
the ethical standards of the legal profession” and that the American Medical
Association (AMA) “which governs the ethical standards of the medical
profession, does not declare restrictive covenants per se unethical,” but rather
applies a reasonableness standard.77 The New Jersey Committee opinion was
limited to those employed as attorneys and did not address the applicability of
RPC 5.6 to an attorney employed as a businessperson.78
2.

How Other Jurisdictions Have Addressed the Issue

Only five other jurisdictions’ ethics committees have specifically
addressed the topic of noncompete agreements between in-house counsel and
corporate employers.
Three jurisdictions (Virginia, Philadelphia, and

73. Id.
74. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006) (quoting N.J. RULES PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1:14).
75. Id.
76. Id.; see also Cmty. Hosp. Group, Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 895–96 (2005).
77. Cmty. Hosp. Group Inc., 869 A.2d at 896.
78. See N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006).
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Washington D.C.) have reached conclusions similar to New Jersey’s.79 Two
jurisdictions (Washington and Connecticut) have taken the position that
restrictive covenants can be acceptable if they have so-called “savings clauses”
indicating that the covenants are “to be interpreted to comply with any
applicable rules of professional conduct” and expressly cite ABA Model Rule
5.6 or its related state or jurisdictional rule.80
The Virginia State Bar Committee was presented with a hypothetical
asking whether a lawyer employed as in-house counsel for a company, who
would have access to the company’s trade secrets and other confidential
information, could enter into an agreement that restricted him from being
employed by a competitor for one year following the termination of his
employment with the company (however, he would be allowed to serve as
outside counsel of a competitor as long as he did not disclose confidential
company information).81 The committee opinion was that “restriction of the
lawyer’s practice which prevents him from serving as in-house counsel for a
competitor for a period of one year violates [the predecessor to Virginia RPC
5.6, Virginia’s version of Model Rule 5.6], even though service as outside
counsel for a competitor is permitted.”82
The Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee was
presented with an inquiry as to whether an attorney employed as a manager of
technical compliance services for a non-law firm employer, whose
responsibilities encompassed activities that could be performed by either a
lawyer employed by an outside law firm or a lawyer employed by the non-law
firm employer, could sign a letter of employment that provided
If you should leave the Firm, you agree that during the two year period
following your departure, you will not directly or indirectly solicit, agree to
perform or perform services of any type that the Firm can render (Services) for
any person or entity who paid or engaged the Firm for Services, or who
received the benefit of Firm Services, or with whom you had any substantial
dealing while employed by the Firm. However, this restriction with respect to
Services applies only if such Services were rendered by you or an office or unit
of the Firm in which you worked or over which you had supervisory authority.
83
You also may not assist any employer or other third party in the foregoing.

The Philadelphia Committee indicated that because it was clear that certain
services which the firm rendered could also be provided by an attorney, the
79. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 291 (1999); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance
Comm., Op. 96-5 (1996); Va. Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Opinion 1615
(1995).
80. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006); see also Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm.
on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 2100 (2005).
81. Va. Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Opinion 1615 (1995).
82. Id.
83. Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm. Op. 96-5 (1996).
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letter of employment appeared to restrict the employee-attorney from rendering
legal services to persons who were current clients of the firm and therefore was
a restriction on the employee-attorney’s right to practice law upon termination
of his employment with the firm and, “as such, violate[d] Rule 5.6.”84 The
committee left somewhat open the question of whether the restrictive covenant
could be tailored to limit the ability of the attorney to go to another company to
do what he currently did for his present employer, because it did not have
enough information to determine whether what the attorney currently did could
be considered being engaged in the practice of law.85
The Washington D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, in Opinion 291,
opined that
A lawyer seeking temporary employment or a lawyer seeking the temporary
services of another lawyer may not enter into a contract with a lawyer
placement agency that requires the temporary lawyer to agree not to apply for
or to accept subsequent employment with a firm to which he was assigned or
with a client of the firm. Such restriction would violate Rule 5.6. A lawyer
seeking temporary employment may agree to notify the placement agency if
within a stated period the lawyer accepts subsequent employment at the firm to
86
which he was assigned on a temporary basis.

The D.C. Committee quoted the various ABA Ethics Opinions cited in sections
I.A and I.B.1 above, as well as several of the leading cases cited in section
I.A.87 It further noted that “[w]hile it is permissible for a temporary agency to
charge a reasonable fee to a client organization that hires a temporary lawyer,
the lawyer should not be asked to decline employment to facilitate enforcement
of the contract between the temporary agency and the client organization.”88
Washington State Bar Association Informal Opinion No. 2100 dealt with
an employment agreement containing what the New Jersey Advisory
Committee on Professional Ethics referred to as a “savings clause.”89 The
restrictive covenant reviewed by the Washington State Bar Association read as
follows:
For a period of five years after end of employment, the employee shall not
directly or indirectly own, control, consult with, act as an independent
contractor to, or be employed by any business similar to that conducted by the
Company. As it relates to the practice of law, this provision shall be
interpreted consistent with the Washington RPCs (or similar rules in other
jurisdictions), including RPCs 5.6, 1.9, and 1.6. Employee shall not solicit any
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 291 (1999).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Informal
Op. 2100 (2005).
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of the company’s customer accounts or operate within the Company’s general
trading area. If a customer contacts the Employee about legal representation,
Employee shall be free to provide legal representation consistent with the
90
RPCs . . . .

The Washington State Bar Association opined that the provision did not violate
RPC 5.6(a) because it dealt “specifically with a lawyer’s post-employment
activities that are not related to the practice of law.”91 The policy behind RPC
5.6 is that noncompete agreements: (1) limit a lawyer’s professional autonomy
and (2) limit the ability of clients to choose an attorney.92 The provision here
did neither “because it specifically state[d] that as [the provision] relate[d] to
the practice of law that the [Rules of Professional Conduct] control, and it also
allow[ed] for the ‘Company’s’ customers to contact the former ‘Employee’
regarding legal representation.”93
Connecticut Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Informal
Opinion No. 02-05 is another example of an ethics opinion addressing a
“savings clause.”94 The restrictive covenant reviewed by the Connecticut
Committee provided that the noncompetition agreement would be effective and
binding “only to the extent permissible under Rule 5.6(1)” of the Connecticut
Rules of Professional Conduct.95 Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct
5.6(1) is identical to Model Rule 5.6(a).96 The rationale for prohibiting
agreements that restrict a lawyer’s future ability to practice law is that such
covenants restrict the ability of a client to select the counsel of their choice.97
Rule 5.6 only applies to restrictions on the future practice of law and thus does
not apply to “otherwise permissible restrictions on activities constituting
something other than ‘the practice of law.’”98 Thus, the inclusion of the
“savings clause” limiting the noncompetition provision to matters other than
the future practice of law alleviates any ethical concerns.99
II. ANALYSIS
As noted previously, there are primarily four approaches to noncompete
restrictive covenants in agreements pertaining to the employment of attorneys:
(1) a per se ban on all direct and indirect noncompete restrictive covenants; (2)
the enforceability of reasonable financial disincentives similar to liquidated
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 2100 (2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002).
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damages clauses; (3) a common law reasonableness test similar to that which
governs noncompete agreements for other professions and businesses; and (4)
the use of savings clauses.100 This Part provides a critical analysis of these
alternative approaches by exploring why in-house counsel and other corporateemployed attorneys are different from attorneys practicing law in law firms,
why the rules should be different as they pertain to corporate-employed
attorneys, and why the jurisdictions should apply a consistent approach. This
analysis will advocate adopting the reasonableness test approach applied in
other professions when evaluating noncompete restrictions for corporate inhouse counsel and other corporate-employed attorneys.
A.

Rules for In-House Counsel Should Differ from Rules for Attorneys
Employed by Law Firms

Many commentators have debated the merits of a per se ban on attorneys’
post-employment restrictive covenants.101 The majority have favored a
reasonableness test type of approach for all attorneys that is comparable to how
other professionals are treated.102 Regardless of which side one chooses in this
debate, the issue as it pertains to in-house counsel should be considered
100. See supra Part I.A.
101. See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 4, at 53–54 (suggesting a “compensatory approach advances
professionalism as well as economic efficiency” by promoting long-term investments by law
firms in professionalism and client relations, and “allowing lawyers to negotiate reasonable terms
upon which they can part company and make their services available to clients”); Neil W.
Hamilton, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business? The Erosion of Rule 5.6 and the Bar
Against Restrictions on the Right to Practice, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1409, 1433 (1996) (“If
courts adopt a balancing of interests approach or a commercial rule of reason approach to
restrictions on the right to practice, they will cause further erosion of the freedom of clients to
select counsel of their choice.”); Herbert, supra note 63, at 279 (“The current rule disregards not
only the legitimate business interests of law firms, but also the judicial acceptance . . . of
restrictive covenants among other professionals.”); Parker, supra note 47, at 19–20 (“[A] close
examination of the traditional justifications offered for the prohibition on restrictive covenants
reveals those justifications to be either obsolete, or flawed . . . .”); Wilcox, supra note 13, at 970
(“A rule of reason analysis . . . offers a better approach to the issue . . . . The current disciplinary
rule and the per se refusal of courts to enforce noncompetition agreements are inappropriately
rigid approaches that do not give adequate consideration to legitimate interests of a law firm.”).
102. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 63, at 279 (“[T]he rule should be revised to adopt the
modern common law reasonableness standard, thereby affording to law firms the same right long
enjoyed by the rest of the business and professional communities.” (citation omitted)); Kalish,
supra note 62, at 456–57 (“The evolving balancing test is a suitable mechanism for determining
whether a restrictive covenant should be enforced. There is no reason . . . to exclude the legal
profession from the general test . . . . Model Rule 5.6(a) should be interpreted to prohibit only
unreasonable restrictive covenants. The courts should enforce reasonable covenants not to
compete.”); Parker, supra note 47, at 19–20 (advocating changes to Indiana Rule 5.6 that would
incorporate the common law reasonableness test); Wilcox, supra note 13, at 970 (“[E]ach
agreement restricting competition by a lawyer should be evaluated on the basis of whether
enforcement would be reasonable in the particular situation.”).
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separately due to the nature of the organizations in which in-house counsel
work and the nature of the duties that they perform.
1.

What Is the Practice of Law?

What constitutes the practice of law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and is often determined on a case-by-case103 or “I know it when I see it”
basis.104 Black’s Law Dictionary defines the “practice of law” as
103. Christine R. Davis, Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdictional Practice in
Today’s Legal Profession, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2002).
104. Soha F. Turfler, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not Now, When? An
Alternative Approach to Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1903, 1907 n.19,
1908 (2004); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-6 (2007) (defining the practice of law as including the
actions of anyone who appears in a representative capacity before a court or similar legal tribunal,
gives legal advice, or acts in a legal representative capacity; but making exceptions for certain
nonlawyer activities such as a person or corporation carrying on its own business and certain title
or property related functions); MO. REV. STAT. § 484.010.1 (2000) (“The ‘practice of law’ is
hereby defined to be and is the appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity or the
drawing of papers, pleadings or documents or the performance of any act in such capacity in
connection with proceedings pending or prospective before any court of record, commissioner,
referee or any body, board, committee or commission constituted by law or having authority to
settle controversies.”); COLO. R. CIV. P. 201.3(2)(b) (stating that the practice of law includes
employment as a lawyer for a corporation with the primary duties of “(i) Furnishing legal
counsel, drafting documents and pleadings, and interpreting and giving legal advice with respect
to the law, and/or (ii) Preparing, trying or presenting cases before courts, executive departments,
administrative bureaus or agencies . . . .”); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 705(g) (“the term ‘practice of law’
shall mean: (1) private practice as a sole practitioner or for a law firm, legal services office, legal
clinic or the like; (2) practice as an attorney for an individual, a corporation, partnership, trust, or
other entity, with the primary duties of furnishing legal counsel, drafting legal documents and
pleadings, interpreting and giving advice regarding the law or preparing, trying or presenting
cases before courts, departments of government or administrative agencies; (3) practice as an
attorney for the Federal government or for a state government with the same primary duties as
described in paragraph (g)(2) above; (4) employment as a judge, magistrate, referee, or similar
official for the Federal or a state government, provided that such employment is available only to
licensed attorneys; (5) legal service in the armed forces of the United States; (6) employment as a
full-time teacher of law at a law school approved by the American Bar Association; or (7) any
combination of the above”); VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6, § I(B), (explaining that whether a person’s
activities constitute the practice of law depends on whether an attorney-client relationship exists,
and that one is practicing law whenever he furnishes to another advice or services which imply
his possession and use of legal knowledge or skill; however, sections I(B)(1)–(3) make specific
exceptions for those who are performing such functions on behalf of their employers); Windover
v. Sprague Techs., 834 F. Supp. 560, 566 (D. Conn. 1993) (referring to the definition provided by
the Connecticut Supreme Court in State Bar Ass’n of Conn. v. The Conn. Bank and Trust Co., 140
A.2d 863, 870 (Conn. 1958), which held that “the ‘practice of law’ includes ‘the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation of legal instruments covering an
extensive field.’”); Ark. Bar Ass’n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ark. 1959) (stating that “it is
impossible to frame any comprehensive definition of what constitutes the practice of law. Each
case must be decided upon its own particular facts . . . . Perhaps it does not admit of exact
definition.”). The Windover court noted that although the holding of State Bar Ass’n of Conn.
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The professional work of a duly licensed lawyer, encompassing a broad
range of services such as conducting cases in court, preparing papers
necessary to bring about various transactions from conveying land to
effecting corporate mergers, preparing legal opinions on various points
of law, drafting wills and other estate-planning documents, and
advising clients on legal questions. The term also includes activities
that comparatively few lawyers engage in but that require legal
expertise, such as drafting legislation and court rules.105
Despite the fact that many of the states’ and other jurisdictions’ definitions
are very broad or general, similar to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition,
many have carved out various exceptions in order to avoid prosecuting certain
parties under the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) rules of the
jurisdiction.106 Additionally, some jurisdictions have indicated that there is no
clear line between what is and is not the practice of law.107 One of these
jurisdictions has stated that “there is a region wherein much of what lawyers do
every day in their practice may also be done by others without wrongful
invasion of the lawyers’ field.”108 The ABA Task Force on the Model
Definition of the Practice of Law recommended that each state and territory
adopt its own definition of the practice of law which should include the
premise that it is the “application of legal principles and judgment to the
circumstances or objectives of another person or entity.”109 Thus, the legal
would imply that in-house counsel would be engaged in the practice of law since they typically
provide legal advice to their employer, “in-house counsel working in Connecticut who are not
members of the Connecticut bar probably would be considered to be in violation of § 51-88 . . . .
Yet, the large number of in-house counsel working in Connecticut who are not members of the
state bar tends to show either that this interpretation of the statute is incorrect or that the statute is
not enforced.” 834 F. Supp. at 566. For a comprehensive listing of state definitions, see
American Bar Association Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Standing
Committee on Client Protection, Washington State Bar Association, Report to the House of
Delegates, app. A (2003), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model_def_statutes.pdf (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).
105. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1210–11 (8th ed. 2004).
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 31(d)(7), (9), (10) & (17) (setting forth various exceptions
when an officer or employee of a corporation who is not a member of the state bar may represent
the corporation before various Arizona tribunals or may prepare documents for use in the regular
course of business if these documents are not available to third parties); D.C. CT. APP. R. 49(c)(6)
(furnishing an exception for internal counsel providing legal advice only to their regular
employer, where the employer does not reasonably expect that it is receiving advice from a
person authorized to practice law in the District of Columbia).
107. Cardinal v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn. 1988); Pulse
v. N. Am. Land Title Co. of Mont., 707 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Mont. 1985).
108. Cardinal, 433 N.W.2d at 867.
109. American Bar Association Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law,
Standing Committee on Client Protection, Washington State Bar Association, Report to the
House of Delegates (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_
803.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). The Task Force also indicated that the states should
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profession continues to have varied definitions amongst the jurisdictions and
the debate as to what constitutes the practice of law continues.
This debate has been considerable, especially given the multi-jurisdictional
practice issues inherent in the practice of corporate law and the impact on inhouse counsel.110 Multi-jurisdictional practice is the “legal work of a lawyer in
a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted to practice law.”111 Lawyers
in the United States are licensed to practice law within a particular state or
jurisdiction; there is no national license to practice law.112 This state or
jurisdictional licensing process began because “the need for legal services was
locally based and often involved the need for representation in court.”113
However, the nature of legal representation has evolved to include more
counsel and advice outside the courthouse.114 Additionally, the advent of large
national and multinational corporations that require legal services across the
country, smaller companies with offices in multiple states, information and
communication technology, and the increasing complexity of legal practice,
have increased the need to provide legal advice and representation across state
lines.115 Today, no jurisdiction categorically excludes out-of-state lawyers,
and there are a multitude of jurisdictions that accommodate certain out-of-state
lawyers.116 The ABA’s MJP Report recommended several changes to the
Model Rules to bring about more cohesion across the jurisdictions and address
concerns about the regulation of the multi-jurisdictional practice of law.117 It
recommended adoption of such changes by the states and other jurisdictions.118

determine who may provide certain services that are included within the definition of the practice
of law. Id.
110. Davis, supra note 103, at 1343; Philip L. Pomerance, Multijurisdictional Practice and
the Health Lawyer: Will Your Practice Benefit Form the New ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct?, 37 J. HEALTH L. 113, 113 (2004).
111. ABA COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE
21ST CENTURY 4 (2002) [hereinafter MJP REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mjp/final_mjp_rpt_121702.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
112. Id. at 6.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10.
116. MJP REPORT, supra note 111, at 8–9.
117. Id. at 1. The provision of the Model Rules that relates primarily to in-house counsel
provides “A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended
from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that: (1) are
provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which
the forum requires pro hac vice admission[.]” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)
(2003).
118. MJP REPORT, supra note 111, at 1.
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Do In-House Counsel Practice Law?

In-house corporate counsel perform a variety of functions that can vary
from corporation to corporation and even within a corporation. These
functions may include “advising clients on litigation matters, transactional
matters, matters relating to . . . national and international business practices,
areas of federal and state regulation, the supervision of outside counsel, and the
internal management of day-to-day client legal work.”119 Other in-house
attorneys are specialists in practice fields that involve purely federal issues that
have nothing to do with licensure in a particular state.120 Therefore, “in-house
counsel are more likely to practice law in other jurisdictions and least likely to
know in advance which UPL regulations will apply to them.”121 “In-house
counsel are often viewed as administrators who facilitate the outsourcing of
most of the company’s legal work but do little of it themselves.”122 Given
advances in technology, many companies are requiring their in-house counsel
to “take on a broader, strategic role.”123
Do these various functions performed by in-house counsel fall within the
definition of the practice of law? The answer appears to be yes under the very
broad definitions of most states.124 However, as previously indicated, this
could vary from state-to-state. At least five jurisdictions have indicated that inhouse counsel do not need to be admitted to the bar because their work is not
deemed to be the practice of law.125 Some of the duties of in-house counsel
fall squarely within the practice of law definitions, for example, advising
clients on litigation or legal matters.126
However, can the same parallel be drawn with regards to duties such as
supervising outside counsel and internal management of day-to-day internal
legal work? Most corporate in-house counsel are not directly involved in
litigation but rather are the “conduits between the company and its litigation
attorneys.”127 “Companies without in-house counsel are often forced to assign
119. Davis, supra note 103, at 1354.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. In-House Counsel: Life in the Corporate Wing, LAWCROSSING.COM, http://www.law
crossing.com/article/index.php?id=1171 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 103–109 and accompanying text.
125. ABA Center for Prof’l Responsibility, Jt. Comm. on Lawyer Regulation, In-House
Corporate Counsel Rules (Mar. 13, 2007) (providing a summary chart of what jurisdictions have
adopted Model Rule 5.5(d)(1) regarding multi-jurisdictional practice of in-house counsel).
Specifically, Alabama, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and Maryland have
indicated that in-house counsel work is not deemed to be practice of law. Id. Virginia
specifically exempts in-house counsel from the definition of the practice of law. VA. SUP. CT. R.
Pt. 6, § I(B)(1)–(3).
126. See various state or jurisdiction definitions, supra note 104.
127. Williams, supra note 9, at 81.
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a high-ranking officer to coordinate the work of outside firms.”128 When inhouse counsel primarily supervises the work of outside counsel, the
corporation is relying on the legal advice of outside counsel, not in-house
counsel, and therefore this would be more of a management function than a
legal advice or “practice of law” function. The same parallel can be drawn
with regards to transactional attorneys employed as in-house counsel. These
attorneys may spend most of their time drafting agreements that deal much
more extensively with the business aspects of the corporation than with its
legal aspects, and these agreements are often reviewed by outside counsel to
ensure compliance with any relevant laws.
As noted above, there are a broad variety of functions performed by inhouse attorneys. “Although many in-house lawyers view themselves—and are
viewed [by others]—solely as legal professionals, [they] are also senior
members of a management team with the rights and responsibilities associated
with that position.”129 Therefore, what one chooses to do as an in-house
counsel is not limited by the practice of law.130
3.

Are All Corporate-Employed Attorneys Similar, or Do Job
Responsibilities Determine Whether They Practice Law?

Not all corporate attorneys are employed as in-house counsel. Other
corporate areas that may employ attorneys include: compliance, risk
management, regulatory affairs, tax, employee benefits, and contract
negotiation and administration. Just as the duties of in-house corporate
counsel vary, the duties also vary among the attorneys employed in these other
corporate areas.
As a hypothetical example, one large corporation employs attorneys in
several different areas other than the corporate legal or in-house counsel
department. There are attorneys and non-attorneys with the same job
responsibilities that are employed in the compliance and network management
departments. The company grants stock options to top-performing employees
at various levels in the organization, and the stock option agreements contain a
noncompete clause that requires forfeiture or repayment of options vested
within the past year in the event that the individual is employed by a
competitor within two years of leaving the company. The compliance staff
provides regulatory advice to others within the organization and interacts with
state regulators. However, their job responsibilities are varied and do not
require a law degree because although they may do much of the research and

128. Id.
129. Bernard K. Hooper, Choose One: Expediter or cat herder?, 12 A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY,
July–Aug. 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2003-07-08/hooper.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).
130. Id.
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explain state laws and regulations to their internal constituents, they ultimately
rely on the legal department or external legal consultants to interpret the laws
or regulations. Similarly, the network management staff that negotiate
provider network contracts (contracts between a health insurer and the
providers that participate in its network of providers) on behalf of the company
may or may not have law degrees. However, the contracts are typically
standard contracts which require approval by the legal department prior to
making any modification. Despite the fact that attorneys may be employed in
these areas, they cannot be described as “practicing law” because their duties
can be performed by both lawyers and non-lawyers, and their job
responsibilities are primarily business-focused rather than related to the
provision of legal advice. Thus, they should not be treated any differently in
terms of the noncompete clause than any other professional employed by the
corporation. In the event that these individuals leave the company, the
noncompete clause would not prevent them from practicing law at a law firm;
it simply would prevent them from taking a position with a competitor of the
corporation unless they were willing to forfeit the stock options.
4.

Does the Policy Rationale Behind the Prohibition on Noncompete
Restrictions for Attorneys Apply to In-House Counsel or Other
Corporate-Employed Attorneys?

The prevailing policy rationale behind the prohibition of noncompete
restrictions centers on the right of the lawyer to practice his profession and “the
right of the client to choose the lawyer he wishes to represent him.”131 Inhouse counsel only work for one client at a time, and thus the ability of either
the lawyer to choose a client or a client to choose that particular lawyer is
limited by the very nature of the employment arrangement.
This discussion will begin with the right of the lawyer to practice his
profession. In-house lawyers only work for one client at a time, and thus the
lawyer’s autonomy is already constrained by the nature of the employment
relationship. Furthermore, the lawyer is freely choosing to constrain his
autonomy by accepting employment with this employer. Also, the lawyer may
find it advantageous to agree to a noncompete restriction132 because it may
benefit the lawyer financially and it also allows the employer to communicate
more openly with the lawyer, which makes him a more integral part of the
management team and enhances his overall knowledge of the business or
industry. Additionally, a noncompete restriction “will never prohibit a lawyer
from practicing law and using his skills.”133 Only reasonable noncompete

131. Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
132. Kalish, supra note 62, at 450.
133. Id.
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covenants will be upheld, and although restricted as to place or clientele, the
lawyer will always be able to practice law.134
As to the client’s ability to choose a lawyer, a client really does not have
an absolute right to choose whatever attorney he wants.135 A variety of
circumstances interfere with this right, such as conflict of interest rules, the
lawyer’s expertise, the client’s ability to pay, or simply the attorney’s
discretion.136 The ethics rules do not restrict the lawyer’s discretion to refuse a
client. Thus, one reason for refusing a client “could be, if it were allowed, the
fact that the lawyer had previously agreed to a restrictive covenant.”137 In the
case of in-house counsel, the potential new company that is trying to hire the
lawyer may feel strongly that this is the lawyer that they want for their job.
However there are many “competent lawyers in every specialty area, and the
fact that a client cannot have his first choice is realistically not a grave
concern.”138 Additionally, one could question why the company wants this
particular lawyer—is it because of the lawyer’s experience and knowledge in
the industry or because of the lawyer’s experience and knowledge of the
competitor for which he currently works? This can only support a
reasonableness test or balancing test approach to enforcement of noncompete
covenants that are designed to protect legitimate business interests, even when
applied to corporate-employed lawyers.
Additionally, if in-house counsel or other corporate-employed attorneys
are not deemed to be practicing law, then there is no rationale behind the
policy restricting noncompete agreements because there is no lawyer-client
relationship. This same analysis can be applied to other attorneys employed in
non-legal jobs within the company.
B.

Rules for In-House Counsel and Other Corporate-Employed Attorneys
Should Not Differ From Those for Other Corporate Employees
1.

In-House Counsel Versus Other Corporate Employees

The practice of law is the only profession that applies a per se ban on postemployment restrictive covenants. As illustrated above, the reasonableness
test or balancing test approach is applied to post-employment noncompete
restrictions in other professions.139 In the case of in-house counsel, the
corporation’s reasons for wanting the noncompete provision are typically
related to protection of confidential information and trade secrets, particularly

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Herbert, supra note 63, at 273; Parker, supra note 47, at 15.
Parker, supra note 47, at 15.
Kalish, supra note 62, at 451.
Id. at 452.
See supra notes 47–61 and accompanying text.
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with regards to subsequent employment by a competitor. This need for
confidentiality and protection of trade secrets does not vary depending on the
type of professional within the corporation. Thus, why should in-house
counsel be treated any differently than any other corporate employee?
New Jersey Ethics Opinion 708 noted that an attorney is bound by the
ethics requirements to keep certain client confidences secret.140 Additionally,
the Opinion indicated that it was conceivable that a corporation could request
that its in-house lawyers sign a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement for
other client confidences or trade secrets that might not be protected by the
ethics rules.141 However, any nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement may
not restrict the lawyer’s “ability to practice law or seek to expand the
confidential nature of information obtained by the in-house lawyer in the
course of performing legal functions beyond the scope of the [rules of
professional conduct].”142 ABA Opinion No. 1301 also indicated that
protection of client confidences was provided for under various ethics rules.143
Although the ethics rules may protect certain client confidences and a
nondisclosure agreement may theoretically bolster this protection, the penalties
for violation of ethics rules really do not repay the corporation for the breach
of confidence, and the time involved for the corporation to pursue such actions
can be costly.144 Reliance on the Model Rules will not adequately protect the
client because the damage is done, i.e., confidential information or trade
secrets have been revealed and competitors have been able to act upon such
information to the company’s detriment, and there is no compensation given
the client or company for such damage.145 Noncompete agreements with a
financial incentive not to breach the agreement that are entered into in an armslength transaction provide a more meaningful incentive for an in-house counsel
employee not to breach.146 “If the general common law would enforce a
restrictive covenant to protect [the employer’s] interests in the commercial
setting, it should enforce a similar covenant in the legal profession.”147 This is
particularly warranted in the case of in-house counsel and other corporateemployed attorneys since they are more related to the commercial setting than
the legal setting. Given the lack of meaningful enforcement of the disciplinary
rules, “one articulated premise for the . . . per se approach has been

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006).
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 71.
Kalish, supra note 62, at 448–449.
Id. at 448.
See id. at 449.
Id. at 446.
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undermined,”148 particularly when it relates to a corporation and its
confidences and trade secrets.
In summary, when a lawyer moves from law firm to law firm the lawyer is
bound by the ethics rules and these boundaries seem more defined and easier to
abide by since a lawyer always has multiple clients to contend with in a law
practice. However, when a lawyer jumps from one corporation to another, the
lawyer possesses significant information about the corporation and how it
conducts its business, and much of this information may not be protected
within the bounds of the ethics rules. Additionally, due to the nature, position,
or both, of the corporate attorney and the information or knowledge possessed,
the attorney may not be able to clearly define the boundaries of what
information can be used in future employment and thus may unintentionally
divulge information. Thus, reasonable restraints on future employment will
help to protect the corporation from both intentional and unintentional
divulging of corporate information or trade secrets.
Additionally, many in-house counsel perform in more of a hybrid
counsel/senior executive position. Although these individuals may have some
responsibilities that would fall into the broad definition of “practicing law,”
many of their duties are more aligned with the overall strategy of the business.
This hybrid situation further supports the rationale that these are really senior
level executives who are focused on running the business and entrusted with
corporate confidences and trade secrets, and thus should be treated comparably
to other professionals within the corporation in terms of noncompete
restrictions.
2.

Other Corporate-Employed Attorneys Versus Other Employees

The analysis above becomes even more pertinent for those corporate
employees who just happen to have a law degree but who are not employed in
a legal department position. These employees perform functions that other
corporate employees without law degrees also perform, and should be held to
the same standards as these other employees. The corporation’s reasons for
wanting the noncompete provision, i.e., protection of confidential information
or trade secrets with regards to subsequent employment with a competitor,
remain the same. Thus, reasonable noncompete restrictions should be enforced
as to employees that have law degrees just as they are with other corporate
employees.
Although the states that allow “savings clauses” in noncompete agreements
appear to support noncompete restrictions on a corporate-employed attorney in
a legal or non-legal capacity moving to another corporation in a non-legal
capacity,149 a reasonableness test or balancing test approach would be a better
148. Id. at 449.
149. See generally supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
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alternative. It would be a consistent rule that applies to all corporate-employed
attorneys (in-house counsel and other corporate-employed attorneys) moving
to any other corporate employer (regardless of the new corporate position), and
would treat these professionals consistently with other professionals within the
corporation.
C. The States Should Be Consistent
There has been a trend of more companies bringing lawyers in-house.150 It
is expected that “[i]n-house legal staffs will also continue to grow in size,
importance, and sophistication and, in many cases, will provide legal services
at costs lower than private firms.”151 There was a forty percent increase in the
number of in-house lawyers between 1970 and 1980, and a thirty percent
increase between 1980 and 1991.152 Economics is a driving force in bringing
attorneys in-house.153 Even though litigation may still be handled by outside
counsel, the remaining tasks performed in-house can often justify a substantial
cost-savings.154
The main reasons for consistency across jurisdictions as it relates to
noncompete restrictions are the increase in numbers of attorneys working
internally for corporations; their ability to function as members of the
management team; and the corporations’ expectations of being able to hire
these individuals and hold them to the same standards as other employed
professionals in terms of confidential information and trade secrets.
The multi-jurisdictional practice issues are another reason to advocate
consistency across jurisdictions.155 As noted earlier, the advent of large
national and multinational corporations that require legal services across the
country, smaller companies with offices in multiple states, information and
communication technology, and the increasing complexity of legal practice
have increased the need to provide legal advice and representation across state
lines.156 In-house lawyers are typically employed in large national or
multinational corporations or in smaller corporations doing business in
multiple states. Thus, these lawyers are “potentially subject to inconsistent
obligations based on inconsistent definitions of the practice of law,” creating

150. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
151. Michael M. Boone & Terry W. Conner, Change, Change, and More Change: The
Challenge Facing Law Firms, 63 TEX. B.J. 18, 25 (2000).
152. BARBARA A. CURRAN, ET AL., A.B.A., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A
STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S (1985); BARBARA A.
CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, A.B.A., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN THE 1990S (1994).
153. Williams, supra note 9, at 80–81.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 110–118 and accompanying text.
156. MJP REPORT, supra note 111, at 10.
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concerns regarding what types of “legal services they may perform without
fear of unauthorized practice liability.”157 Despite the efforts of the ABA Task
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, the legal profession
A
continues to have varied definitions amongst the jurisdictions.158
standardized definition of the “practice of law” would clarify who was
practicing law for purposes of noncompete restrictions. However, applying a
reasonableness test to noncompete agreements for corporate in-house counsel
and other corporate-employed attorneys would eliminate the need to determine
whether these attorneys “practice law” in evaluating any noncompete
restrictions.
CONCLUSION
Restraints on the practice of law for former corporate in-house counsel
should differ from those for other attorneys in the practice of law. Attorneys in
key management positions that leave one corporation to go to work for another
corporation in the same industry should not be treated any differently than
other professionals employed by the corporation. They are privy to much of
the same corporate knowledge that would allow them to impact the business of
the corporation in the event of their departure. As such, they differ from
attorneys in private practice or attorneys that leave corporate employment to
return to the private practice of law. Therefore, the traditional reasons (i.e., the
right of the lawyer to practice his profession and the ability of a client to
choose the attorney of choice) for not allowing noncompete clauses in
agreements between attorneys and their law firms should not be applicable to
these individuals. First, an in-house attorney’s ability to practice law is already
constrained by the nature of his or her employment by one corporation, and the
lawyer is freely choosing to constrain his autonomy by accepting employment
with this employer. A noncompete restriction would not prohibit the attorney
from practicing law, but rather would only impose reasonable limitations for
the protection of the client/corporation. Second, there are many factors that
limit the ability of the client to choose an attorney (e.g., conflicts of interests,
lawyer expertise, etc.), and reasonable noncompete restrictive covenants
should simply be one more. Therefore, noncompete clauses in employment or
option agreements for corporate-employed attorneys should be held to the
same common law reasonableness test that is used for other professions and
businesses. Applying a common law reasonableness test or balancing test
approach would treat corporate-employed attorneys consistently with other
professionals employed by corporations. It would also provide corporations
with reasonable protections of legitimate business interests, including

157. Turfler, supra note 104, at 1943.
158. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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protection against disclosure, intentional or unintentional, of confidential
information and trade secrets.
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